Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

2026-09-10

AI Summary

本文解决了审批制委员会选举中核心存在的问题，通过引入一种新的投票规则优化类似熵的目标函数来找到核心委员会。

Abstract

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

Problem

• approval-based
• multi-winner elections
• core
• stability
• group fairness

Innovation

• approval-based committee elections
• core
• entropy-like objective function
• polynomial time