🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the fundamental tension between channel liquidity state privacy and third-party verifiability in the Lightning Network (LN). We propose the first dual-assurance verification framework integrating Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) remote attestation with zero-knowledge Transport Layer Security (zkTLS). Methodologically, we design a synergistic mechanism of Hot Proofs—real-time enclave-resident balance attestations leveraging SGX or SEV—and Cold Proofs—on-chain settlement records—precisely delineating security boundaries and trade-offs. We further implement a Balanced Reporting API and zkTLS-based transport-layer verification to jointly ensure hardware-enforced integrity and end-to-end communication privacy. Our key contribution is the first deep integration of TEEs and zkTLS for off-chain liquidity auditing, eliminating risks of node tampering and third-party API leakage. Empirical evaluation demonstrates bounded verification latency, enabling high-confidence, non-intrusive financial capacity verification. The framework delivers a deployable, trustworthy verification infrastructure for LN auditors, service providers, and node operators.
📝 Abstract
Verifying the private liquidity state of Lightning Network (LN) channels is desirable for auditors, service providers, and network participants who need assurance of financial capacity. Current methods often lack robustness against a malicious or compromised node operator. This paper introduces a methodology for the verification of LN channel balances. The core contribution is a framework that combines Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) with Zero-Knowledge Transport Layer Security (zkTLS) to provide strong, hardware-backed guarantees. In our proposed method, the node's balance-reporting software runs within a TEE, which generates a remote attestation quote proving the software's integrity. This attestation is then served via an Application Programming Interface (API), and zkTLS is used to prove the authenticity of its delivery. We also analyze an alternative variant where the TEE signs the report directly without zkTLS, discussing the trade-offs between transport-layer verification and direct enclave signing. We further refine this by distinguishing between enquote{Hot Proofs} (verifiable claims via TEEs) and enquote{Cold Proofs} (on-chain settlement), and discuss critical security considerations including hardware vulnerabilities, privacy leakage to third-party APIs, and the performance overhead of enclaved operations.