Verification of Lightning Network Channel Balances with Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)
This work addresses the fundamental tension between channel liquidity state privacy and third-party verifiability in the Lightning Network (LN). We propose the first dual-assurance verification framework integrating Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) remote attestation with zero-knowledge Transport Layer Security (zkTLS). Methodologically, we design a synergistic mechanism of Hot Proofs—real-time enclave-resident balance attestations leveraging SGX or SEV—and Cold Proofs—on-chain settlement records—precisely delineating security boundaries and trade-offs. We further implement a Balanced Reporting API and zkTLS-based transport-layer verification to jointly ensure hardware-enforced integrity and end-to-end communication privacy. Our key contribution is the first deep integration of TEEs and zkTLS for off-chain liquidity auditing, eliminating risks of node tampering and third-party API leakage. Empirical evaluation demonstrates bounded verification latency, enabling high-confidence, non-intrusive financial capacity verification. The framework delivers a deployable, trustworthy verification infrastructure for LN auditors, service providers, and node operators.