Beyond Lower Quota: Avoiding Overrepresentation in Multi-Winner Voting

2026-06-18

AI Summary

This study addresses the problem of over-representation in multi-winner voting, where a group receives more seats than its proportional share. The paper formally defines this issue for the first time and introduces a novel axiom—Justifiable Upper Quota (JUQ)—to cap a group’s allocated seats at its deserved share. By integrating Thiele rules with classical apportionment methods such as Adams and Sainte-Laguë, the authors develop a composite Thiele framework to systematically analyze voting rules satisfying JUQ. Their main contributions include characterizing Adams-AV as the unique rule fulfilling JUQ, designing a polynomial-time computable rule that satisfies JUQ, and establishing compatibility between JUQ and proportionality axioms like EJR⁺, thereby providing a theoretical foundation for balancing upper and lower quota constraints.

Abstract

Recently, in the social choice literature, much attention has been given to the question of avoiding underrepresentation in approval-based multi-winner voting. In this paper, we explore the largely overlooked complementary question of avoiding overrepresentation. This has not been explored systematically, despite being a desirable property with concrete applications. Intuitively, overrepresentation happens when a group determines a disproportionately large part of the committee, thereby exceeding the group's quota. We formulate a strong and appealing axiom for avoiding overrepresentation, called justifiable upper quota (JUQ). We introduce a generalization of Thiele rules, composite Thiele rules, and characterize the unique rule in this class satisfying our axiom. This rule, Adams-AV, which naturally extends Adams' apportionment method, has not been studied before. Additionally, we introduce a polynomial-time rule that satisfies JUQ. Furthermore, we introduce justified near quota, an axiom that balances avoiding under- and overrepresentation. It characterizes the unique Thiele rule extending the Sainte-Laguë apportionment method. Finally, we analyze the compatibility of our axioms with established proportionality notions such as EJR+.

Problem

• overrepresentation
• multi-winner voting
• approval-based voting
• upper quota
• proportionality

Innovation

• overrepresentation
• justifiable upper quota
• composite Thiele rules
• Adams-AV
• justified near quota