Selected work

Representative Papers

Verifiable affirmative action in Chinese high school admissions

Apr 07, 2025

In China’s high school admissions, quota-based allocation targeting underperforming junior high schools suffers from a lack of verifiability—students cannot audit their admission outcomes using publicly disclosed cutoff scores and private information, undermining policy credibility and anti-corruption capacity. Method: We formally define “synchronous verifiability” and prove that only two specific choice-rule variants of the deferred acceptance mechanism jointly satisfy individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and verifiability. Leveraging mechanism design and game-theoretic modeling, we propose a novel matching mechanism integrating verifiability, strategy robustness, and fairness. Contribution/Results: The mechanism ensures transparent, auditable policy implementation; improves matching efficiency and student welfare; and provides both theoretical foundations and practical tools for credible affirmative action. It resolves the tension among transparency, incentive compatibility, and equity in centralized school assignment.

1 citationsRead paper

One-step group factor analysis via penalized least squares

Aug 30, 2026

本文针对大规模组因子模型的因子载荷和因子估计问题，提出了一种一步惩罚最小二乘法，与传统两步主成分方法相比，该方法在平衡组面板情况下具有更小的极限标准误差。

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On the core of the Shapley-Scarf housing market model with full preferences

Nov 26, 2025

In Shapley–Scarf housing markets, the strong core may be empty under strict preferences, the weak core—though always nonempty—often contains Pareto-inefficient allocations, and the exclusion core may also be empty. This paper systematically analyzes the existence and rationality of these three core concepts. First, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the exclusion core. Building upon this, we propose two novel core notions: the *robust exclusion core* and the *enhanced exclusion core*, both of which are guaranteed to be nonempty and Pareto optimal, and coincide with the strong core whenever the latter is nonempty. Using set-inclusion modeling and formal blocking analysis, we rigorously characterize the hierarchical relationships among all core variants. Our results demonstrate that the new concepts overcome the fundamental limitations of traditional cores—namely, emptiness and inefficiency—thereby significantly enhancing allocation stability and rationality.

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Consistent solutions to the allocation of indivisible objects with general endowments

Nov 26, 2025

This paper addresses the emptiness and inconsistency of solution concepts—particularly the core—in fair allocation of indivisible goods under general assignment models. To resolve these issues, we propose an improved exclusion-core concept. While the strong core may be empty and existing exclusion cores, though nonempty, lack consistency, our new solution strictly satisfies both nonemptiness and consistency axioms, and retains theoretical robustness within generalized market design frameworks. It unifies several classical cases: it coincides with the strong core or the original exclusion core in degenerate settings, while delivering stronger stability and predictive power in general ones. Grounded in cooperative game-theoretic core theory, we employ axiomatic analysis and rigorous derivation to construct, for the first time, an allocation solution that simultaneously guarantees existence, consistency, and interpretability. This advances mechanism design and fair division theory by providing a new benchmark solution concept.

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Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Nov 26, 2025

This paper addresses the Shapley–Scarf housing market model by introducing the “local unanimity” axiom—a generalization of social choice-theoretic unanimity to arbitrary subsets of agents who mutually agree on endowment exchanges. Using axiomatic analysis and game-theoretic reasoning, it provides a formal characterization of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under both strict and weak preference domains. The key contribution is the first incorporation of local unanimity into housing market theory, yielding a concise and complete characterization of TTC: it is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and local unanimity—regardless of the underlying preference structure. This result substantially strengthens the theoretical foundations of TTC and enhances its applicability in mechanism design across diverse preference environments.

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Recent publications

Latest Papers

One-step group factor analysis via penalized least squares

Aug 30, 2026

本文针对大规模组因子模型的因子载荷和因子估计问题，提出了一种一步惩罚最小二乘法，与传统两步主成分方法相比，该方法在平衡组面板情况下具有更小的极限标准误差。

0 citationsRead paper

On the core of the Shapley-Scarf housing market model with full preferences

Nov 26, 2025

In Shapley–Scarf housing markets, the strong core may be empty under strict preferences, the weak core—though always nonempty—often contains Pareto-inefficient allocations, and the exclusion core may also be empty. This paper systematically analyzes the existence and rationality of these three core concepts. First, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the exclusion core. Building upon this, we propose two novel core notions: the *robust exclusion core* and the *enhanced exclusion core*, both of which are guaranteed to be nonempty and Pareto optimal, and coincide with the strong core whenever the latter is nonempty. Using set-inclusion modeling and formal blocking analysis, we rigorously characterize the hierarchical relationships among all core variants. Our results demonstrate that the new concepts overcome the fundamental limitations of traditional cores—namely, emptiness and inefficiency—thereby significantly enhancing allocation stability and rationality.

0 citationsRead paper

Consistent solutions to the allocation of indivisible objects with general endowments

Nov 26, 2025

This paper addresses the emptiness and inconsistency of solution concepts—particularly the core—in fair allocation of indivisible goods under general assignment models. To resolve these issues, we propose an improved exclusion-core concept. While the strong core may be empty and existing exclusion cores, though nonempty, lack consistency, our new solution strictly satisfies both nonemptiness and consistency axioms, and retains theoretical robustness within generalized market design frameworks. It unifies several classical cases: it coincides with the strong core or the original exclusion core in degenerate settings, while delivering stronger stability and predictive power in general ones. Grounded in cooperative game-theoretic core theory, we employ axiomatic analysis and rigorous derivation to construct, for the first time, an allocation solution that simultaneously guarantees existence, consistency, and interpretability. This advances mechanism design and fair division theory by providing a new benchmark solution concept.

0 citationsRead paper

Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Nov 26, 2025

This paper addresses the Shapley–Scarf housing market model by introducing the “local unanimity” axiom—a generalization of social choice-theoretic unanimity to arbitrary subsets of agents who mutually agree on endowment exchanges. Using axiomatic analysis and game-theoretic reasoning, it provides a formal characterization of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under both strict and weak preference domains. The key contribution is the first incorporation of local unanimity into housing market theory, yielding a concise and complete characterization of TTC: it is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and local unanimity—regardless of the underlying preference structure. This result substantially strengthens the theoretical foundations of TTC and enhances its applicability in mechanism design across diverse preference environments.

0 citationsRead paper

Pixel-level Quality Assessment for Oriented Object Detection

Nov 11, 2025

Existing rotated object detectors rely on box-level IoU prediction to assess localization quality; however, such metrics exhibit structural coupling with ground-truth localization accuracy, leading to systematic overestimation of low-quality predictions. To address this, we propose Pixel-level Quality Assessment (PQA), a novel framework that abandons box-level IoU regression and instead models the spatial consistency between predicted and ground-truth rotated bounding boxes in pixel space—enabling decoupled and robust localization quality estimation. PQA employs a spatial consistency aggregation mechanism to produce a unified quality score and can be seamlessly integrated as a plug-and-play module into mainstream rotated detectors. Extensive experiments on HRSC2016 and DOTA demonstrate substantial improvements: PQA boosts Rotated RetinaNet’s AP$_{50:95}$ by 5.96% and reduces standard deviation (STD) by 2.32%, validating both the effectiveness and generalizability of pixel-level quality modeling.

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