Verifiable affirmative action in Chinese high school admissions
In China’s high school admissions, quota-based allocation targeting underperforming junior high schools suffers from a lack of verifiability—students cannot audit their admission outcomes using publicly disclosed cutoff scores and private information, undermining policy credibility and anti-corruption capacity. Method: We formally define “synchronous verifiability” and prove that only two specific choice-rule variants of the deferred acceptance mechanism jointly satisfy individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and verifiability. Leveraging mechanism design and game-theoretic modeling, we propose a novel matching mechanism integrating verifiability, strategy robustness, and fairness. Contribution/Results: The mechanism ensures transparent, auditable policy implementation; improves matching efficiency and student welfare; and provides both theoretical foundations and practical tools for credible affirmative action. It resolves the tension among transparency, incentive compatibility, and equity in centralized school assignment.