Published papers include 'The anarchy-stability tradeoff in congestion games', 'A General Lotto game with asymmetric budget uncertainty', 'When smoothness is not enough: Toward exact quantification and optimization of the price of anarchy', 'Optimal taxes in congestion games'.
Research Experience
Research work mainly focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms in systems with limited resources and the strategic role of information in competitive environments.
Education
PhD student in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, Santa Barbara; Supervisor: Jason Marden; Completed BASc in Engineering Science (Electrical and Computer Engineering Option) with a minor in Robotics and Mechatronics at the University of Toronto.
Background
Research interests include applications of game theory and optimization to problems at the intersection of economics, engineering, computer science, and operations research. Recent work focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms and information manipulation in multiagent systems.