Paper 'Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets' accepted to SODA 2026
Paper 'Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints' accepted to Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)
Paper 'Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions' accepted to SAGT 2025
Paper 'Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents' accepted to ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Paper 'Pandora’s Box Problem Over Time' accepted to WINE 2024
Serving on program committees of top conferences including EC (2025), WINE (2024–2025), WebConf/WWW (2026), AAAI (2026), IJCAI (2025), AAMAS (2025–2026), ECAI (2024–2025), SAGT (2023, 2025)
Reviewer for journals including Naval Research Logistics (2025), Theoretical Computer Science (2023–2025), JAAMAS (2025)
Subreviewer for conferences including STOC (2025), SODA (2026), EC (2020, 2022, 2024), WINE (2017–2021), ITCS (2020), ICALP (2017, 2019, 2025), AAMAS (2018, 2024), SAGT (2022, 2024), STACS (2024), MFCS (2025), SOSA (2025)
Multiple working papers, including 'Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions' and 'The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms'