Artem Tsikiridis
Scholar

Artem Tsikiridis

Google Scholar ID: AdvWQF4AAAAJ
Technical University of Munich
Economics and ComputationAlgorithmic Game Theory
Citations & Impact
All-time
Citations
43
 
H-index
4
 
i10-index
1
 
Publications
14
 
Co-authors
19
list available
Resume (English only)
Academic Achievements
  • Paper 'Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets' accepted to SODA 2026
  • Paper 'Pandora’s Box Problem with Time Constraints' accepted to Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)
  • Paper 'Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions' accepted to SAGT 2025
  • Paper 'Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents' accepted to ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
  • Paper 'Pandora’s Box Problem Over Time' accepted to WINE 2024
  • Serving on program committees of top conferences including EC (2025), WINE (2024–2025), WebConf/WWW (2026), AAAI (2026), IJCAI (2025), AAMAS (2025–2026), ECAI (2024–2025), SAGT (2023, 2025)
  • Reviewer for journals including Naval Research Logistics (2025), Theoretical Computer Science (2023–2025), JAAMAS (2025)
  • Subreviewer for conferences including STOC (2025), SODA (2026), EC (2020, 2022, 2024), WINE (2017–2021), ITCS (2020), ICALP (2017, 2019, 2025), AAMAS (2018, 2024), SAGT (2022, 2024), STACS (2024), MFCS (2025), SOSA (2025)
  • Multiple working papers, including 'Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions' and 'The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms'