Quantum-Resistant Quantum Teleportation

2026-04-17

AI Summary

This work addresses a critical security vulnerability in quantum teleportation: the susceptibility of classical correction channels to quantum attacks. To counter this threat, the authors propose a quantum-attack-resistant teleportation framework integrating post-quantum cryptographic schemes such as Kyber and FrodoKEM. They further identify quantum memory coherence time as a previously overlooked bottleneck that jointly constrains physical and computational security. By jointly modeling amplitude damping noise, stochastic information leakage, and the Holevo information bound, the study reveals a non-monotonic, bell-shaped dependence of classical–quantum joint attack success probability on system parameters and derives closed-form upper bounds linking information leakage to teleportation fidelity. Under realistic conditions—1 ms coherence time and optical fiber channels—the framework enables secure transmission over distances of 191–199 km, establishing a theoretical foundation and design principles for leakage-resilient quantum communication protocols.

Technology Category

• Machine Learning: Quantum Machine Learning
• Computer Vision: Adversarial Attacks & Robustness
• Search and Optimization: Learning to Search

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Search and Retrieval-Augmented AI: Web evaluation methodologies and metrics

Abstract

We propose a quantum-resistant quantum teleportation (QRQT) framework protected by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to secure the classical correction channel, which is vulnerable to quantum adversaries. By applying PQC to the classical control bits, QRQT eliminates the classical attack surface of quantum teleportation. Our analysis reveals that quantum memory is a hidden bottleneck linking physical and computational security: its finite coherence time simultaneously limits communication distance, constrains tolerable PQC overhead, and restricts the adversary attack window. Under realistic parameters (1 ms coherence, fiber-optic propagation), the maximum secure teleportation distance ranges from 191 km (FrodoKEM-1344) to 199 km (Kyber512). We show that the joint classical-quantum attack probability exhibits a non-monotonic, Bell-shaped profile due to the opposing time dependencies of classical cryptanalysis and quantum decoherence, establishing a bounded optimal attack window beyond which adversarial success decays exponentially. We further analyze how leakage of classical correction bits affects teleportation security under four stochastic leakage models: independent exponential, sequential, burst, and correlated leakage, also accounting for amplitude damping on the shared Bell pair. For each scenario, we derive closed-form expressions for the average Holevo quantity and teleportation fidelity as functions of time, providing measurement-independent upper bounds on extractable information and guiding the design of leakage-resilient quantum communication protocols.

Problem

• quantum teleportation
• post-quantum cryptography
• quantum memory coherence
• classical leakage
• quantum security

Innovation

• post-quantum cryptography
• quantum teleportation
• quantum memory coherence
• classical-quantum attack
• information leakage models