On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates the relationship between Greenberg’s (1989) criterion of nondiscriminatory conservative stability and the set of perfect coalition equilibrium paths in repeated coalition games. By employing game-theoretic modeling and set-inclusion analysis, the paper rigorously demonstrates that the set of perfect coalition equilibrium paths coincides precisely with the largest set satisfying the nondiscriminatory conservative stability criterion, thereby establishing its theoretical extremal status among such behavioral standards. This result not only reveals an equivalence between the two concepts but also, for the first time, explicitly characterizes the maximality and normative significance of the perfect coalition equilibrium path set, offering a novel theoretical foundation for the analysis of coalition stability.
Application Category
📝 Abstract
We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.
Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior
Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
Coalitional Repeated Game
Nondiscriminating
Equilibrium Paths
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior
Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
Coalitional Repeated Game
Nondiscriminating Behavior
Equilibrium Paths
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