Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains

2026-03-31

AI Summary

This study addresses the proliferation of spam MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) in high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, which consumes block resources, degrades user experience, and exacerbates network externalities. The paper presents the first theoretical framework for analyzing spam MEV, integrating game-theoretic and competitive equilibrium models, and empirically validates its findings using on-chain data from Base and Arbitrum. The analysis reveals that block space expansion nonlinearly amplifies spam MEV, while imposing a minimum gas price and ordering transactions by gas fee effectively mitigates its adverse effects. Moreover, moderately constraining block capacity achieves a Pareto improvement between throughput and externalities. As user demand grows, the share of spam MEV asymptotically stabilizes.

Abstract

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer to this as spam MEV. On major rollups, it can at times consume more than half of block gas, even though only a small fraction of probes ultimately results in a trade. Despite growing awareness of this phenomenon, there is no principled framework for understanding how blockchain design parameters shape its prevalence and impact. We develop such a framework, modeling spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical evidence from Base and Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduced. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, spam is always costly: when block capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices; as block capacity grows, it increasingly consumes execution resources, raising network externality, i.e., the cost of provisioning and processing blocks. We show that spam takes an increasing share of each additional unit of block capacity, so capping it before all users are included creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eliminates disproportionate spam and externality. Second, we extend the analysis to priority fee ordering and show that ordering transactions by gas price helps reduce spam, as spammers must pay more to reach early block positions. Third, as user demand grows and blockspace is scaled accordingly, spam's share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitely.

Problem

• spam MEV
• blockspace
• maximal extractable value
• blockchain design
• transaction spam

Innovation

• spam MEV
• blockchain design
• competitive equilibrium
• transaction fee mechanism
• network externality