🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the problem of compiling arbitrary $mathsf{MIP}^*$ protocols into succinct interactive arguments with *classical communication and classical verifiers*, while achieving *post-quantum security*. Methodologically, it introduces the first generic compiler for $mathsf{QIP}$—requiring only semi-malicious security—and integrates subexponentially hard LWE-based assumptions, quantum interactive proofs, and succinct argument techniques to achieve classical verification. Key contributions are: (1) the first post-quantum secure compilation framework transforming $mathsf{MIP}^*$ protocols into classical succinct arguments; (2) communication complexity of $mathrm{polylog}(T)$, substantially improving upon prior constructions; and (3) efficient verification with provable security under standard post-quantum hardness assumptions—namely, the subexponential hardness of LWE.
📝 Abstract
We present a generic compiler that converts any $mathsf{MIP}^{*}$ protocol into a succinct interactive argument where the communication and the verifier are classical, and where post-quantum soundness relies on the post-quantum sub-exponential hardness of the Learning with Errors ($mathsf{LWE}$) problem. Prior to this work, such a compiler for $mathsf{MIP}^{*}$ was given by Kalai, Lombardi, Vaikuntanathan and Yang (STOC 2022), but the post-quantum soundness of this compiler is still under investigation. More generally, our compiler can be applied to any $mathsf{QIP}$ protocol which is sound only against semi-malicious provers that follow the prescribed protocol, but with possibly malicious initial state. Our compiler consists of two steps. We first show that if a language $mathcal{L}$ has a $mathsf{QIP}$ with semi-malicious soundness, where the prover runs in time $T$, then $mathcal{L} in mathsf{QMATIME}(T)$. Then we construct a succinct classical argument for any such language, where the communication complexity grows polylogarithmically with $T$, under the post-quantum sub-exponential hardness of $mathsf{LWE}$.