Proofs of No Intrusion

2025-10-07

AI Summary

Traditional data security mechanisms cannot reliably detect data exfiltration, as classical copying leaves no forensic trace. Method: This paper introduces “Intrusion-Proofing”—a novel paradigm enabling non-invasive, remote intrusion detection on quantum servers hosting ciphertexts. Leveraging fully homomorphic encryption and the quantum no-cloning theorem, we construct a verifiable coset-state measurement knowledge proof, extended to support unclonable decryption keys and signature tokens. A classical client verifies server integrity and data confidentiality via classical communication alone—without modifying, accessing, or backing up the original quantum-stored data. Contribution/Results: We experimentally demonstrate the framework’s feasibility in cloud environments. Our approach establishes the first provably secure, non-destructive method for remote attestation of quantum-server integrity and ciphertext confidentiality, introducing a new verification-centric paradigm for data security.

Technology Category

• Machine Learning: Quantum Machine Learning
• Data Mining & Knowledge Management: Representing, Reasoning, and Using Provenance, Trust
• Computer Vision: Adversarial Attacks & Robustness

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Data transparency and provenance
• Web Mining and Content Analysis: Web data provenance, reliability, and authenticity
• Semantics and Knowledge: Provenance, trust, security and privacy, and ethical issues in managing semantic data

Abstract

A central challenge in data security is not just preventing theft, but detecting whether it has occurred. Classically, this is impossible because a perfect copy leaves no evidence. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, forbids general duplication, opening up new possibilities. We introduce Proofs of No Intrusion, which enable a classical client to remotely test whether a quantum server has been hacked and the client's data stolen. Crucially, the test does not destroy the data being tested, avoiding the need to store a backup elsewhere. We define and construct proofs of no intrusion for ciphertexts assuming fully homomorphic encryption. Additionally, we show how to equip several constructions of unclonable primitives with proofs of non-intrusion, such as unclonable decryption keys and signature tokens. Conceptually, proofs of non-intrusion can be defined for essentially any unclonable primitive. At the heart of our techniques is a new method for non-destructively testing coset states with classical communication. It can be viewed as a non-destructive proof of knowledge of a measurement result of the coset state.

Problem

• Detecting quantum server intrusion without data destruction
• Enabling classical clients to verify data theft remotely
• Constructing non-intrusive proofs for unclonable quantum primitives

Innovation

• Quantum mechanics enables non-destructive intrusion detection
• Classical client remotely tests quantum server security
• Coset state testing with classical communication methods