Segment-Level Coherence for Robust Harmful Intent Probing in LLMs

📅 2026-04-16
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
📄 PDF

career value

223K/year
🤖 AI Summary
Existing streaming detection methods for identifying harmful intent in large language models are prone to false positives due to reliance on isolated sensitive tokens, particularly undermining reliability in high-stakes scenarios such as CBRN threats. This work proposes a segment-level consistency-based streaming detection mechanism that requires multiple evidence tokens to jointly support a prediction, rather than depending on a single high-scoring token, thereby substantially enhancing robustness. Analysis of internal activations reveals that features from attention or MLP layers outperform those from residual streams. The proposed method also demonstrates plug-and-play capability for character-level encrypted attack detection. Experimental results show that, at a 1% false positive rate, the true positive rate improves by 35.55% over strong baselines, achieving an AUROC of 98.85%—a significant gain even against a near-saturated baseline performance of 97.40%.

Technology Category

Application Category

📝 Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly exposed to adaptive jailbreaking, particularly in high-stakes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) domains. Although streaming probes enable real-time monitoring, they still make systematic errors. We identify a core issue: existing methods often rely on a few high-scoring tokens, leading to false alarms when sensitive CBRN terms appear in benign contexts. To address this, we introduce a streaming probing objective that requires multiple evidence tokens to consistently support a prediction, rather than relying on isolated spikes. This encourages more robust detection based on aggregated signals instead of single-token cues. At a fixed 1% false-positive rate, our method improves the true-positive rate by 35.55% relative to strong streaming baselines. We further observe substantial gains in AUROC, even when starting from near-saturated baseline performance (AUROC = 97.40%). We also show that probing Attention or MLP activations consistently outperforms residual-stream features. Finally, even when adversarial fine-tuning enables novel character-level ciphers, harmful intent remains detectable: probes developed for the base LLMs can be applied ``plug-and-play'' to these obfuscated attacks, achieving an AUROC of over 98.85%.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

harmful intent probing
false positives
CBRN
LLMs
jailbreaking
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

segment-level coherence
streaming probing
harmful intent detection
adversarial robustness
activation probing
🔎 Similar Papers
No similar papers found.