STARDIS: Strategic Scheduling and Deceptive Signaling for Satellite Intrusion Detection System Deployment

2026-03-03

AI Summary

This work addresses the challenge of achieving real-time intrusion detection in resource-constrained satellite communication networks without compromising efficiency. To this end, the authors propose a dual-loop defense framework: at the ground segment, time-varying wireless links are modeled using historical data to estimate environmental statistical characteristics; at the onboard segment, detection tasks are dynamically scheduled via receding-horizon optimization, and—leveraging Bayesian persuasion theory for the first time—a deceptive signaling mechanism is designed to mislead attackers’ perception of telemetry downlink channels. This approach decouples security enforcement from resource scheduling, preserving detection performance while significantly reducing attacker utility, and provides formal security guarantees. Theoretical analysis integrating Lyapunov stability, game theory, and channel modeling confirms the framework’s effectiveness and resource efficiency.

Technology Category

• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Optimization of Spatio-temporal Systems
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Satisfiability
• Search and Optimization: Distributed Search

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Cyber-crime defenses and forensics
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Energy management for devices in mobile Web and WoT environments
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems

Abstract

Satellite communication networks operate under stringent computational constraints and are susceptible to sophisticated cyberattacks. This paper introduces a novel defense framework that decouples security optimization into ground-based analysis and onboard real-time execution. In the long-term loop, the ground segment processes historical data to estimate key statistical parameters of the task environment. Additionally, we incorporate the time-varying characteristics of satellite wireless links to account for the dynamic communication context. In the short-term loop, the satellite employs a receding horizon optimization that models dynamic task arrivals and maximizes a utility function considering detection rates and resource costs. To counter intelligent adversaries interception, we introduce a deception mechanism using Bayesian persuasion theory. By strategically manipulating the short-term action sequences in the telemetry downlink, we mislead an external attacker's beliefs. We mathematically model the attacker's optimal response under channel uncertainty and demonstrate that our framework significantly reduces attacker utility. The approach's effectiveness is formally proven using Lyapunov theory.

Problem

• satellite intrusion detection
• cyberattack
• resource constraints
• deceptive signaling
• intelligent adversaries

Innovation

• strategic scheduling
• deceptive signaling
• Bayesian persuasion
• receding horizon optimization
• Lyapunov stability