🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates whether the strategic behavior of large language models in game-theoretic settings stems from genuine reasoning or reliance on memorized patterns. To disentangle memory from reasoning, the authors introduce a novel counterfactual game framework—systematically altering incentive structures in canonical games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Rock-Paper-Scissors to break inherent symmetries and dominance relationships. Employing a multidimensional evaluation protocol grounded in game-theoretic analysis, the research demonstrates that models struggle to adapt to modified incentives in counterfactual scenarios, exhibiting strong dependence on familiar patterns encountered during training. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: current models lack robust strategic generalization and true reasoning capabilities in dynamic decision-making contexts.
📝 Abstract
We evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in repeated game-theoretic settings to assess whether strategic performance reflects genuine reasoning or reliance on memorized patterns. We consider two canonical games, Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), upon which we introduce counterfactual variants that alter payoff structures and action labels, breaking familiar symmetries and dominance relations. Our multi-metric evaluation framework compares default and counterfactual instantiations, showcasing LLM limitations in incentive sensitivity, structural generalization and strategic reasoning within counterfactual environments.