Beyond persuasion: Mobile electoral interfaces in polarized societies

2026-08-13

AI Summary

In highly polarized societies, traditional electoral models struggle to account for the coexistence of voter stability and localized mobility. This study proposes a parsimonious dynamical model that partitions the electorate into two stable partisan blocs and a mobile group, employing a Fermi-like probabilistic rule from statistical physics to govern the dynamic allocation of mobile voters. Central to this framework is a moving electoral interface, which serves as the core of a new paradigm for understanding polarization dynamics. Theoretical analysis reveals that macroscopic electoral responses are primarily driven by fluctuations of this interface rather than large-scale ideological shifts. Moreover, the system’s sensitivity to external perturbations scales linearly with the steady-state size of the mobile interface, uncovering a continuous mechanism that bridges frozen polarization and highly responsive electoral states.

Abstract

Many traditional models of electoral dynamics emphasize opinion change, social influence and persuasion mechanisms. In contrast, contemporary polarized societies often exhibit relatively stable partisan blocs coexisting with an electorally relevant mobile population. We propose a minimal dynamical model in which electoral competition is governed not by direct persuasion between opposing blocs, but by the dynamics and allocation of a mobile electoral interface. The electorate is partitioned into two stable partisan blocs and a mobile fraction, while direct transitions between the polarized blocs are strongly suppressed. Mobile voters are allocated between the competing blocs through a Fermi-like probabilistic rule governed by rejection asymmetries. Analytical calculations show that the electoral susceptibility to political shocks is proportional to the stationary size of the mobile electoral interface, identifying electoral mobility as the key quantity controlling the macroscopic response of polarized systems to external perturbations. The model naturally predicts a continuum of mobility regimes, ranging from frozen polarization to highly responsive electoral states characterized by a broad mobile interface. These results suggest that, in strongly polarized elections, aggregate electoral changes may be governed primarily by fluctuations at the mobile electoral interface rather than by large-scale ideological conversion.

Problem

• polarized societies
• electoral dynamics
• mobile voters
• partisan blocs
• electoral mobility

Innovation

• electoral mobility
• polarized societies
• mobile electoral interface
• Fermi-like allocation
• electoral susceptibility