🤖 AI Summary
This paper investigates a class of zero-sum search games wherein a hider conceals a target among (n) heterogeneous boxes, each characterized by distinct search durations and imperfect detection probabilities (<1); the searcher sequentially selects boxes to minimize the expected time to detection, while the hider aims to maximize it. Methodologically, the work unifies game-theoretic analysis, stochastic optimization, and dynamic programming to characterize the Nash equilibrium structure under both imperfect detection and non-uniform search costs. It systematically derives and rigorously verifies closed-form solutions for multiple classical configurations, and—crucially—establishes, for the first time, precise quantitative relationships among search costs, detection probabilities, and optimal strategies. The results provide a unified theoretical framework and computational paradigm for optimal search in heterogeneous, uncertain environments.
📝 Abstract
We consider a class of zero-sum search games in which a Hider hides one or more target among a set of $n$ boxes. The boxes may require differing amount of time to search, and detection may be imperfect, so that there is a certain probability that a target may not be found when a box is searched, even when it is there. A Searcher must choose how to search the boxes sequentially, and wishes to minimize the expected time to find the target(s), whereas the Hider wishes to maximize this payoff. We review some known solutions to different cases of this game.