A Case for Competition in Information Provision

2026-08-25

AI Summary

研究了有偏见的新闻来源之间的竞争如何影响信息和福利，通过引入对立偏见来源和提高误报成本来改善接收者福利。

Abstract

We study how competition among biased news sources affects information and welfare when sources can misrepresent facts at a cost. Monopolistic and competitive market structures admit many equilibria. We develop a common belief-based selection criterion that applies to both and makes welfare comparisons possible. Under the refined outcomes, adding an oppositely biased source improves the receiver's welfare when that source faces sufficiently high misreporting costs. Competition disciplines the incumbent while introducing a few distortions of its own. Better information need not increase total welfare, and distorted advice from a monopolist can raise total welfare. Competition may improve decision-making without being socially beneficial.

Problem

• competition
• biased news sources
• information provision
• welfare

Innovation

• competition among biased sources
• common belief-based selection criterion
• welfare comparison
• misreporting costs