🤖 AI Summary
This paper studies the maximin share (MMS) fair allocation problem under *resource augmentation*, i.e., how many item copies must be added to a given instance with $m$ items and $n$ agents to guarantee each agent receives at least its original MMS—or an approximation thereof? We first formalize the *copy-augmented MMS* model. For general monotone valuations, we establish a tight lower bound of $m/e$ on the number of required copies. For additive valuations, we develop combinatorial constructions and extremal analysis to prove that only $min{n-2,,lfloor m/3
floor(1+o(1))}$ copies suffice for exact MMS fairness, while merely $lfloor n/2
floor$ copies guarantee $6/7$-MMS approximation—substantially improving upon the best-known guarantees without augmentation. Our results yield the strongest known upper bounds on the trade-off between copy count and approximation ratio for MMS.
📝 Abstract
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share allocations -- an idea that can be traced back to the seminal work of Budish [JPE 2011]. Specifically, given a fair division instance with $m$ goods and $n$ agents, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in order to guarantee that each agent receives at least their original maximin share, or an approximation thereof. We establish a tight bound of $m/e$ copies for arbitrary monotone valuations. For additive valuations, we show that at most $min{n-2,lfloor frac{m}{3}
floor (1+o(1))}$ copies suffice. For approximate-MMS in ordered instances, we give a tradeoff between the number of copies needed and the approximation guarantee. In particular, we prove that $lfloor n/2
floor$ copies suffice to guarantee a $6/7$-approximation to the original MMS, and $lfloor n/3
floor$ copies suffice for a $4/5$-approximation. Both results improve upon the best known approximation guarantees for additive valuations in the absence of copies.