Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks

2026-09-04

AI Summary

本文研究了近场条件下物理层认证在模仿攻击下的问题，通过最小化合法发送者与攻击者信号之间的均方误差来分析，并提出了单天线和多天线攻击者的最优预编码方案。

Abstract

This paper studies physical-layer authentication (PLA) in the near-field regime under impersonation attacks. Unlike the far-field case, where the steering vector depends only on the angle of arrival (AoA), in the near field it depends on both angle and distance. We analyze the attack by minimizing the mean-square error (MSE) between the signal received from a legitimate transmitter Alice and the signal generated by an active attacker Eve. For a single-antenna Eve, we derive the optimal scalar precoder and show that, under the standard second-order Fresnel approximation, perfect impersonation is possible only if Eve has the same angle and the same distance from Bob as Alice. We then extend the analysis to a multi-antenna Eve and derive the optimal precoding vector. In this case, perfect impersonation is possible only if Alice steering vector belongs to the subspace spanned by Eve steering vectors. Simulation results show that, in the near field, a distance difference is sufficient to prevent a successful impersonation attack even when Alice and Eve have the same AoA, and confirm the analytical results.

Problem

• Physical-Layer Authentication
• Near-Field
• Impersonation Attacks
• Steering Vector

Innovation

• near-field physical-layer authentication
• impersonation attacks
• mean-square error (MSE)
• steering vector
• distance and angle dependency