π€ AI Summary
This work addresses the challenge of ambiguous authorization boundaries in multi-agent systems, where task delegation often leads to unauthorized actionsβa risk inadequately captured by existing security benchmarks lacking architectural-level evaluation of authorization preservation. To bridge this gap, the authors introduce MasDrift, the first benchmark explicitly designed to assess authorization preservation across multi-agent architectures, featuring 600 benign tasks spanning eight domains and formalizing authorization preservation as a measurable design property. Empirical evaluation reveals that while centralized architectures achieve high task completion rates (93.9β98.6%), they exhibit unacceptably high rates of unauthorized behavior (2.7β19.8%). In response, two defense mechanisms grounded in the location of authorization evidence are proposed: user request reanchoring reduces unauthorized actions with only a 1.6% drop in completion rate, whereas policy chain propagation incurs up to a 36.3% performance penalty, underscoring the critical role of coordination mechanisms in mitigating authorization failures.
π Abstract
Multi-agent systems (MAS) decompose long-horizon tasks across supervisors and subagents, but delegated goals do not necessarily carry their original authorization boundaries. Existing safety benchmarks mainly study adversarial compromise, while work on constraint drift lacks controlled architecture-level evaluation. We introduce MasDrift, a benchmark of 600 benign productivity tasks across eight domains. Each task pairs required work with reserved actions. MasDrift compares single-agent, centralized, and decentralized coordination while varying hierarchy depth and peer width, measuring task completion and authorization preservation. Across generic multi-agent conditions, centralized hierarchies achieve 93.9--98.6% task completion versus 85.7--87.0% for peer networks, while unauthorized actions occur in 2.7--19.8% of tasks versus 0.6--0.8%, a gap that widens with hierarchy depth. We further compare two defenses that differ in where authorization evidence resides. One re-anchors every pending call to the original user request. The other carries an attenuated policy along the delegation chain. Re-anchoring reduces unauthorized actions in every model configuration we evaluate, at a cost of 1.6 points of pooled completion. Chain propagation blocks required work instead, forfeiting up to 36.3 points. A heterogeneous case study confirms that the failure follows from coordination rather than model strength. MasDrift exposes a centralization tradeoff and makes authorization preservation a measurable property of MAS design.