Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
online voting
strategyproofness
proportional representation
temporal voting
fairness
Online Temporal Voting: Strategyproofness, Proportionality and Asymptotic Analysis
🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the challenge of simultaneously achieving strategyproofness and proportional representation in online multi-round voting. The authors propose a formal framework for designing online mechanisms that guarantee both strategic robustness and fair representation. By introducing Online Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (OIIA) as a sufficient condition for Online Strategyproofness (OSP), and by defining notions of manipulability cost and asymptotic satisfaction of proportionality, they conduct a rigorous game-theoretic and mechanism design analysis of Perpetual Phragmén, Equal Shares, and a newly proposed Serial Dictator rule. Their results show that the first two rules satisfy OSP, while Serial Dictator uniquely combines full strategyproofness with an asymptotic Proportional Justified Representation (PJR) guarantee, thereby unifying strategic resilience and representational fairness.
📝 Abstract
We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known game theoretic properties, strategyproofness (SP) and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that online independence of irrelevant alternatives (OIIA) is a sufficient condition for online strategyproofness (OSP), and that several known online voting rules satisfy OIIA and thus OSP, but that they are not SP. In particular, we show that Perpetual Phragmen, the only known online voting rule to satisfy PJR, satisfies OSP. The Method of Equal Shares (MES), a semi-online voting rule knwon to satisfy wEJR, also satisfies OSP. We then introduce the price of manipulability, which quantifies the effect of strategic behaviour on proportional representation guarantees. Finally, we introduce asymptotic satisfaction of proportional representation and show that an online voting rule, Serial Dictator, is fully strategyproof and satisfies proportional justified representation (PJR) up to an additive constant.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
online temporal voting
strategyproofness
proportional representation
asymptotic analysis
price of manipulability
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