🤖 AI Summary
This work investigates the practical privacy guarantees of federated learning (FL) for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on private client data. We find that, despite avoiding raw-data sharing, the global model can still leak client training samples via parameter updates—a risk that intensifies with model scale. To quantify this threat, we propose an enhanced generative attack that reconstructs training data by tracking multiple rounds of global model updates. We systematically evaluate defenses including differential privacy, gradient regularization, and secure alignment of LLMs. Experiments demonstrate that standard FL poses substantial privacy risks; however, combining safety-aligned LLMs with constrained model updates significantly mitigates leakage. Our findings challenge the common “federated = secure” assumption and provide empirically grounded, deployable privacy-enhancement strategies for LLM federated fine-tuning.
📝 Abstract
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) with local data is a widely adopted approach for organizations seeking to adapt LLMs to their specific domains. Given the shared characteristics in data across different organizations, the idea of collaboratively fine-tuning an LLM using data from multiple sources presents an appealing opportunity. However, organizations are often reluctant to share local data, making centralized fine-tuning impractical. Federated learning (FL), a privacy-preserving framework, enables clients to retain local data while sharing only model parameters for collaborative training, offering a potential solution. While fine-tuning LLMs on centralized datasets risks data leakage through next-token prediction, the iterative aggregation process in FL results in a global model that encapsulates generalized knowledge, which some believe protects client privacy. In this paper, however, we present contradictory findings through extensive experiments. We show that attackers can still extract training data from the global model, even using straightforward generation methods, with leakage increasing as the model size grows. Moreover, we introduce an enhanced attack strategy tailored to FL, which tracks global model updates during training to intensify privacy leakage. To mitigate these risks, we evaluate privacy-preserving techniques in FL, including differential privacy, regularization-constrained updates and adopting LLMs with safety alignment. Our results provide valuable insights and practical guidelines for reducing privacy risks when training LLMs with FL.