🤖 AI Summary
Existing P2P security surveys are significantly outdated, failing to cover theoretical advances in classic threats—such as Sybil and routing attacks—over the past decade, and omitting emerging challenges and solutions driven by machine learning, social network analysis, and dynamical systems. This survey systematically reviews security research on P2P networks from 2014 to 2024. We integrate cross-domain techniques—including cryptographic primitives, multidimensional trust models, lightweight machine learning, and dynamic topology analysis—to propose a novel *fusion-based defense paradigm*. Unlike prior surveys, ours provides a comprehensive, critical assessment of the applicability and limitations of existing approaches. Moreover, it explicitly identifies open problems and concrete future research directions. By bridging theoretical innovation and system-level implementation, this work establishes a timely, authoritative, and actionable academic benchmark for the P2P security community.
📝 Abstract
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are a cornerstone of modern computing, and their security is an active area of research. Many defenses with strong security guarantees have been proposed; however, the most-recent survey is over a decade old. This paper delivers an updated review of recent theoretical advances that address classic threats, such as the Sybil and routing attacks, while highlighting how emerging trends -- such as machine learning, social networks, and dynamic systems -- pose new challenges and drive novel solutions. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these solutions and suggest directions for future research.