🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the limitations of traditional industrial control system (ICS) intrusion detection methods that rely on binary labels, which fail to capture the rich diversity of attack behaviors. The authors propose a physics-informed behavioral representation framework that maps multivariate process trajectories into five interpretable behavioral patterns: drift, spike, oscillation, repetition, and switching, thereby transcending the binary evaluation paradigm. For the first time, cross-dataset hierarchical behavioral evaluation is conducted across multiple ICS benchmarks—including SWaT, WADI, and HAI—exposing significant dataset biases and model blind spots. Experimental results reveal a substantial performance degradation under behavioral stratification (e.g., macro F1 on SWaT drops from 85.44% to 37.84%), highlighting the inadequacy of conventional evaluation metrics in reflecting real-world detection capabilities.
📝 Abstract
Intrusion detection in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is typically evaluated on a small set of public benchmarks using binary ``normal'' versus ``attack'' labels, a practice that can mask the behavioral diversity of cyber-physical attacks. To address this limitation, we propose a behavioral characterization framework that maps raw multivariate process traces into five interpretable physical primitives: drift, spike, oscillation, repetition, and switching. We apply the framework to three widely used ICS benchmarks, namely, SWaT, WADI, and HAI, and show that attack windows exhibit clear behavioral shifts relative to normal operation while the three datasets occupy largely distinct regions of the behavioral space, revealing both cross-dataset bias and intra-dataset diversity. In particular, WADI is dominated by repetition, HAI emphasizes sustained drift and oscillation, and SWaT is characterized by stealthier frozen-telemetry behavior. To examine the evaluation implications, we use an indicative Random Forest baseline and show that aggregate binary metrics can limit visibility into performance across different behavioral proxies. For example, in SWaT, macro F1 drops from 85.44% under binary evaluation to 37.84% under behavior-proxy multiclass prediction, with similar degradations observed on WADI and HAI. Based on these findings, we argue for complementing conventional binary benchmarking with behavior-stratified evaluation to expose blind spots that aggregate scores leave hidden and to better support targeted incident response.