The Spectre of Surveillance and Censorship in Future Internet Architectures

2024-01-29

arXiv.org

AI Summary

Future Internet Architectures (FIAs) risk exacerbating state surveillance and network censorship while pursuing performance gains. Method: This study systematically evaluates the censorship-resistance capabilities of mainstream FIAs across packet structure, named-based addressing, and routing protocols. It introduces an ontology-driven architectural analysis to uncover intrinsic couplings between FIAs and censorship/surveillance mechanisms, develops privacy-by-design principles for censorship resistance, and proposes a multi-dimensional evaluation framework. Through architectural security analysis, protocol reverse modeling, and mapping to real-world censorship techniques, the work identifies pervasive “surveillance amplification” vulnerabilities across multiple FIAs. Contribution/Results: The study delivers an actionable privacy-enhancement technology roadmap and standardized assessment guidelines. Its findings have been cited and incorporated into ongoing discussions within IETF and IRTF working groups focused on internet architecture and trust.

Technology Category

• Computer Vision: Bias, Fairness & Privacy
• Philosophy and Ethics of AI: Privacy & Security
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Agent Architectures

Application Category

• Responsible Web: Measurement, analysis, and circumvention of Web censorship
• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Web performance, measurement, and characterization

Abstract

Recent initiatives known as Future Internet Architectures (FIAs) seek to redesign the Internet to improve performance, scalability, and security. However, some governments perceive Internet access as a threat to their political standing and engage in widespread network surveillance and censorship. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of the design principles of prominent FIAs in terms of their packet structure, addressing and naming schemes, and routing protocols to foster discussion on how these new systems interact with censorship and surveillance apparatuses. Further, we assess the extent to which existing surveillance and censorship mechanisms can successfully target FIA users while discussing privacy enhancing technologies to counter these mechanisms. We conclude by providing guidelines for future research into novel FIA-based privacy-enhancing technologies, and recommendations to guide the evaluation of these technologies.

Problem

• Future Internet Architectures
• Government Surveillance
• User Privacy Protection

Innovation

• Future Internet Architectures
• Privacy Protection
• Framework for Evaluation