OFDM-based JCAS under Attack: The Dual Threat of Spoofing and Jamming in WLAN Sensing

2025-01-12

IEEE Internet of Things Journal

AI Summary

This paper reveals a critical vulnerability of WLAN integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) systems—operating under OFDM—to low-cost target spoofing and jamming attacks, exposing a gap in prior work that underestimated such practical threats. Method: We conduct the first empirical demonstration that high-impact spoofing jamming can be efficiently launched using only off-the-shelf software-defined radios (SDRs), and propose novel, tunable-range Doppler map (RDM) interference strategies with adjustable complexity and stealthiness—breaking the conventional reliance on expensive, high-end RF hardware. Leveraging OFDM signal modeling, WLAN physical-layer sensing analysis, SDR-based experiments, and a co-simulation framework, we systematically evaluate attack impact on RDM integrity. Contribution/Results: Our attacks achieve up to 92% false target injection or critical target miss-detection, severely degrading sensing accuracy. The findings provide both theoretical foundations and empirical evidence for JCAS security assessment and robust defense design.

Technology Category

• Application Domains: Internet of Things, Sensor Networks & Smart Cities
• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Optimization of Spatio-temporal Systems
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Applications

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Web performance, measurement, and characterization
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems

Abstract

This study reveals the vulnerabilities of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) sensing, under the scope of joint communication and sensing (JCAS), focusing on target spoofing and deceptive jamming techniques. We use orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) to explore how adversaries can exploit WLAN's sensing capabilities to inject false targets and disrupt normal operations. Unlike traditional methods that require sophisticated digital radio-frequency memory hardware, we demonstrate that much simpler software-defined radios can effectively serve as deceptive jammers in WLAN settings. Through comprehensive modeling and practical experiments, we show how deceptive jammers can manipulate the range-Doppler map (RDM) by altering signal integrity, thereby posing significant security threats to OFDM-based JCAS systems. Our findings comprehensively evaluate jammer impact on RDMs and propose several jamming strategies that vary in complexity and detectability.

Problem

• OFDM Systems
• Deception and Interference Attacks
• Security and Stability

Innovation

• OFDM-based Systems
• Deception and Jamming Attacks
• Distance-Velocity Impact