π€ AI Summary
This study addresses core conceptual challenges in requirements engineering (RE) concerning legal requirements (LRs)βincluding definitional ambiguity, inconsistent conceptualization, ill-defined attributes, and weak empirical grounding. Adopting a rapid literature review methodology, we systematically coded and analyzed how LRs are defined, classified, assigned functional or non-functional status, and characterized with respect to dynamism, overlap, and implementability across RE literature. Our analysis reveals, for the first time, that LRs are routinely reduced to static compliance baselines; suffer from definitional inconsistency, insufficient operationalization, and limited empirical validation; and lack consensus on theoretical positioning. We thus propose reconceptualizing LRs as a distinct requirement type characterized by normative bindingness, dynamic evolution, and cross-domain dependency. This work establishes a rigorous conceptual foundation and empirical basis for modeling, verifying, and governing LRs in RE practice.
π Abstract
Out of a personal puzzlement, recent peer review comments, and demonstrable confusion in the existing literature, the paper presents a rapid review of the concept of legal requirements (LRs) in requirements engineering (RE) research. According to reviewing results, a normative understanding of LRs has often been present, although proper definitions and conceptual operationalizations are lacking. Some papers also see LRs as functional and others as non-functional requirements. Legal requirements are often characterized as being vague and complex, requiring a lot of effort to elicit, implement, and validate. These characterizations supposedly correlate with knowledge gaps among requirements engineers. LRs are also seen to often change and overlap. They may be also prioritized. According to the literature, they seem to be also reluctantly implemented, often providing only a minimal baseline for other requirements. With these and other observations, the review raises critical arguments about apparent knowledge gaps, including a lack of empirical evidence backing the observations and enduring conceptual confusion.