GPS Spoofing Attacks on Automated Frequency Coordination System in Wi-Fi 6E and Beyond

2025-09-02

AI Summary

This study exposes a critical security vulnerability in Wi-Fi 6E/7 Automatic Frequency Coordination (AFC) systems stemming from their blind trust in GPS-derived location reports. We demonstrate that low-cost software-defined radios can execute GPS spoofing attacks to falsify access point (AP) geolocations, thereby coercing AFC systems into allocating unauthorized spectrum or erroneously disabling APs—causing cross-regional interference, service outages, and detrimental impacts on public safety communications. For the first time, we empirically validate this attack on real-world commercial AFC infrastructure, covering malicious scenarios including spectrum misuse, geographic boundary violation, and service disruption. Our work reveals the absence of location integrity protection in current AFC architectures and establishes “trusted positioning” as a foundational security requirement for next-generation unlicensed spectrum management. The findings provide both theoretical grounding and actionable guidance for standard evolution and system hardening.

Technology Category

• Application Domains: Mobility, Driving & Flight
• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Optimization of Spatio-temporal Systems
• Multiagent Systems: Agent Communication

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Location- and context-aware Web and WoT applications and services
• Responsible Web: Measurement, analysis, and circumvention of Web censorship

Abstract

The 6 GHz spectrum, recently opened for unlicensed use under Wi-Fi 6E and Wi-Fi 7, overlaps with frequencies used by mission-critical incumbent systems such as public safety communications and utility infrastructure. To prevent interference, the FCC mandates the use of Automated Frequency Coordination (AFC) systems, which assign safe frequency and power levels based on Wi-Fi Access Point (AP)-reported locations. In this work, we demonstrate that GPS-based location reporting, which Wi-Fi APs use, can be spoofed using inexpensive, off-the-shelf radio equipment. This enables attackers to manipulate AP behavior, gain unauthorized spectrum access, cause harmful interference, or disable APs entirely by spoofing them into foreign locations. We validate these attacks in a controlled lab setting against a commercial AP and evaluate a commercial AFC system under spoofed scenarios. Our findings highlight critical gaps in the security assumptions of AFC and motivate the need for stronger location integrity protections.

Problem

• GPS spoofing attacks on Wi-Fi AFC systems
• Unauthorized spectrum access causing harmful interference
• Security gaps in location integrity protections

Innovation

• GPS spoofing attacks on AFC systems
• Using off-the-shelf radio equipment
• Validated in controlled lab setting