🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates whether code-based post-quantum cryptographic schemes, such as McEliece and BIKE, are vulnerable to side-channel attacks during the decapsulation phase that could leak secret keys through power consumption. Using low-cost equipment to capture electromagnetic emissions and combining simple power analysis (SPA) with machine learning modeling, the authors demonstrate—for the first time—that partial bits of the session key can be successfully recovered using only 200 power traces. The experiments reveal a strong correlation between electromagnetic emanations during decapsulation and secret key values, providing concrete evidence of practical side-channel vulnerabilities in these schemes. These findings underscore the necessity of incorporating physical security considerations into the design and deployment of post-quantum cryptographic implementations.
📝 Abstract
Post-Quantum cryptography is about to substitute current cryptographic schemes as being resilient in attacks from quantum computers. McEleiece and Bit Flip Key Encapsulation (BIKE) are two delight representatives based on coding theory where classical structural attacks against these algorithms can be successfully phased out by selecting the appropriate key size. Using low cost equipment, the method of Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is used in this paper to evaluate whether or not there is significant information leakage during the decapsulation phase where the shared secret key is generated. Executing a related experiment it is shown that correlation between electromagnetic emissions and secret values exists. In the aftermath, with only 200 power traces collected, machine learning models can predict secret bits of the shared session key, produced during the decapsulation.