Learning to Agree under Pseudo-Reciprocity

2026-08-23

AI Summary

研究解决了在伪互惠条件下理性社会学习中达成共识的问题，发现单个双向链接即可保证大规模群体的共识。

Abstract

We characterize the communication networks that ensure consensus in rational social learning under the sure-thing principle. A network ensures consensus if and only if it is pseudo-reciprocal, a property under which reciprocity may fail between individuals but holds at a coarser group level. Prior work has assumed message exchange to be bidirectional, yet such pairwise reciprocity proves largely dispensable. We show that a single bidirectional link can suffice, however large the population.

Problem

• consensus
• pseudo-reciprocity
• communication networks

Innovation

• pseudo-reciprocity
• consensus
• communication networks