🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses logical-layer attacks—particularly Logic-Programmed Control Injection (LPCI)—in Agentic Web environments, proposing the first unified zero-trust security architecture tailored for agent-centric networks. Methodologically, it establishes a decentralized identity foundation built on Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs); designs a protocol-agnostic agent naming service and a multi-layered trust fabric; and introduces three novel components: a trust-adaptive runtime environment, a causal-chain audit mechanism, and behavior-proof-based dynamic identity authentication. The primary contribution is a formally verified security guarantee: within a rigorous model, the architecture achieves provable defense against LPCI with bounded success probability. Empirical evaluation demonstrates substantial improvements in security, resilience, and trustworthiness of agent ecosystems, enabling fine-grained, real-time trust decisions under highly dynamic and heterogeneous agent deployments.
📝 Abstract
This paper presents a Unified Security Architecture that fortifies the Agentic Web through a Zero-Trust IAM framework. This architecture is built on a foundation of rich, verifiable agent identities using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs), with discovery managed by a protocol-agnostic Agent Name Service (ANS). Security is operationalized through a multi-layered Trust Fabric which introduces significant innovations, including Trust-Adaptive Runtime Environments (TARE), Causal Chain Auditing, and Dynamic Identity with Behavioral Attestation. By explicitly linking the LPCI threat to these enhanced architectural countermeasures within a formal security model, we propose a comprehensive and forward-looking blueprint for a secure, resilient, and trustworthy agentic ecosystem. Our formal analysis demonstrates that the proposed architecture provides provable security guarantees against LPCI attacks with bounded probability of success.