🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the challenge of formally reconciling conflicting stakeholder preferences in group decision-making. Methodologically, it introduces a logic-based Middle Position framework, defining an attribute-driven preference statement model that integrates both hierarchical and lexicographic preference structures, and provides a general formal definition of the Middle Position. Theoretically, it characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness, revealing its intrinsic properties—namely, potential non-existence or multiplicity of solutions. Algorithmically, it devises efficient procedures to decide existence and construct Middle Positions when they exist. The primary contributions are: (i) establishing the first rigorous logical foundation for the Middle Position within preference logic; (ii) providing a verifiable and computationally tractable approach to consensus modeling; and (iii) delivering formal support for ethical deliberation—such as in trolley-problem scenarios—and negotiation systems requiring principled preference aggregation.
📝 Abstract
In group decisions or deliberations, stakeholders are often confronted with conflicting opinions. We investigate a logic-based way of expressing such opinions and a formal general notion of a middle ground between stakeholders. Inspired by the literature on preferences with hierarchical and lexicographic models, we instantiate our general framework to the case where stakeholders express their opinions using preference statements of the form I prefer 'a' to 'b', where 'a' and 'b' are alternatives expressed over some attributes, e.g., in a trolley problem, one can express I prefer to save 1 adult and 1 child to 2 adults (and 0 children). We prove theoretical results on the existence and uniqueness of middle grounds. In particular, we show that, for preference statements, middle grounds may not exist and may not be unique. We also provide algorithms for deciding the existence and finding middle grounds.