🤖 AI Summary
This paper systematically reviews advances in delegation choice research, bridging classical economic theory and algorithmic perspectives from computer science. Methodologically, it employs bibliometric analysis and critical synthesis, uniquely organizing interdisciplinary models through the lens of algorithmic design logic—thereby unifying formal modeling of delegation decisions, computational complexity analysis, mechanism design, and equilibrium characterization. The contributions are threefold: (1) a structured theoretical framework with a unified taxonomy for delegation problems; (2) a rigorously annotated, authoritative reading list of seminal works; and (3) principled insights into the design rationale and feasibility boundaries of delegation mechanisms under computational constraints. These results provide foundational support and an interdisciplinary research paradigm for extending delegation theory to emerging domains—including algorithmic governance, platform economics, and human–AI collaboration—where strategic delegation interfaces with computational limits and institutional design.
📝 Abstract
The problem of delegated choice has been of long interest in economics and recently on computer science. We overview a list of papers on delegated choice problem, from classic works to recent papers with algorithmic perspectives.