🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the lack of systematic empirical analysis on the real-world adoption of Bitcoin privacy protocols and corresponding regulatory responses. Leveraging longitudinal on-chain measurements combined with heuristic rules and protocol-specific behavioral fingerprints, it presents the first large-scale quantification of second-generation anonymity protocols such as CoinJoin and CoinSwap. The analysis identifies 5.94 million CoinJoin and 23.3 million CoinSwap transactions, revealing an overall adoption rate below 1% and a marked decline following key regulatory events. Furthermore, the findings indicate a shift toward privacy-enhancing practices that rely on invisible or non-observable mechanisms, while Stealth Addresses have yet to achieve standardized deployment across the ecosystem.
📝 Abstract
We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5.94 million CoinJoin and 23.3 million CoinSwap transactions. Besides, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the Wasabi wallet operation period. Our analysis reveals consistently low adoption rates, with these protocols constituting less than 1% of network transactions, and a sharp decline in detectable usage following key regulatory events. Furthermore, we find no evidence of standardised Stealth Address adoption, indicating a failure to converge on a common privacy standard. This study provides a comprehensive picture of a niche ecosystem whose on-chain visibility has been largely suppressed, strongly suggesting the migration of privacy-seeking users to less transparent and less detectable methods.