🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses a persistent source of predictive bias in surprisal theory: the ambiguity in defining linguistic units and their misalignment with tokenization schemes used by language models. To resolve this, the authors propose a unified framework that systematically disentangles unit definition from the selection of prediction regions—the first such formal separation in surprisal analysis. By treating tokenization as an implementation detail rather than a theoretical primitive, the approach integrates surprisal theory, the probabilistic mechanisms of pretrained language models, and formal modeling of linguistic units. This integration establishes a principled alignment between psycholinguistic experiments and computational models, substantially enhancing surprisal’s predictive validity, theoretical rigor, and cross-model comparability.
📝 Abstract
Surprisal theory links human processing effort to the predictability of an upcoming linguistic unit, but empirical work often leaves the notion of a unit underspecified. In practice, experimental stimuli are segmented into linguistically motivated units (e.g., words), while pretrained language models assign probability mass to a fixed token alphabet that typically does not align with those units. As a result, surprisal-based predictors depend implicitly on ad hoc procedures that conflate two distinct modeling choices: the definition of the unit of analysis and the choice of regions of interest over which predictions are evaluated. In this paper, we disentangle these choices and give a unified framework for reasoning about surprisal over arbitrary unit inventories. We argue that surprisal-based analyses should make these choices explicit and treat tokenization as an implementation detail rather than a scientific primitive.