🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the systemic crisis in peer review characterized by reviewer shortages and declining review quality. It introduces, for the first time, a game-theoretic approach to peer review mechanism design, proposing a voluntary lottery-based pre-rejection scheme: authors may voluntarily opt into a random pre-rejection process to collectively reduce the overall reviewing burden and thereby enhance the quality of reviews for the remaining submissions. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that when researchers care about the welfare of the scientific community, a Nash equilibrium exists in which authors willingly participate in the mechanism. This work not only reveals the feasibility of incentive-compatible collective action in scholarly communication but also offers a novel pathway toward systematically improving the quality of published scientific research.
📝 Abstract
The volume of scientific manuscripts is growing faster than the capacity to evaluate them, yet the institutions that govern peer review have remained largely unchanged. The result is a widening mismatch: reviewer scarcity, noisier assessments, and declining confidence in editorial decisions. Every scientist wants better reviews, but review quality depends on the total burden, which no single author can shift. To isolate this tension, we provide a game-theoretic thought experiment: a voluntary lottery in which authors accept a chance of random pre-review rejection, reducing reviewer burden and improving the quality of surviving evaluations. We show that a Nash equilibrium emerges in which authors voluntarily enter the lottery. Scientists who care about the literature they read, not just the papers they publish, will opt in, raising the quality of published science for all.