Distributional Preferences for Market Design
🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses how to effectively incorporate distributional preferences into market design while preserving path independence of choice rules. The authors propose a unified framework that integrates distributional preferences into market mechanisms: in decentralized settings, a greedy choice rule is employed, whereas in centralized markets, the deferred acceptance algorithm achieves preference-optimal matching. This framework subsumes classical models such as quotas and matroids and accommodates complex distributional objectives like overlapping identities. Through axiomatic analysis and comparative statics, the paper establishes structural properties under path independence, proves the existence of a unique optimal mechanism in both market types, and expands the applicability of distributional policies.
Application Category
📝 Abstract
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a greedy rule uniquely maximizes these preferences; in centralized markets, the associated deferred-acceptance mechanism uniquely implements them. This framework subsumes canonical models, such as reserves and matroids, while accommodating complex objectives involving intersectional identities that lie beyond the scope of existing approaches. Our analysis provides unified axiomatic foundations and comparative statics for a broad class of distributional policies.
Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
distributional preferences
market design
intersectional identities
choice rules
deferred-acceptance mechanism
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
distributional preferences
path independence
deferred-acceptance mechanism
market design
intersectional identities
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