Explaining and Preventing Alignment Collapse in Iterative RLHF

📅 2026-05-05
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📝 Abstract
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) typically assumes a static or non-strategic reward model (RM). In iterative deployment, however, the policy generates the data on which the RM is retrained, creating a feedback loop. Building on the Stackelberg game formulation of this interaction, we derive an analytical decomposition of the policy's true optimization gradient into a standard policy gradient and a parameter-steering term that captures the policy's influence on the RM's future parameters. We show that standard iterative RLHF, which drops this steering term entirely, suffers from alignment collapse: the policy systematically exploits the RM's blind spots, producing low-quality, high-reward outputs whose feedback reinforces the very errors it exploits. To mitigate this, we propose foresighted policy optimization (FPO), a mechanism-design intervention that restores the missing steering term by regularizing the policy's parameter-steering effect on RM updates. We instantiate FPO via a scalable first-order approximation and demonstrate that it prevents alignment collapse on both controlled environments and an LLM alignment pipeline using Llama-3.2-1B.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

alignment collapse
iterative RLHF
reward model
feedback loop
policy optimization
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

alignment collapse
Stackelberg game
foresighted policy optimization
parameter-steering term
iterative RLHF
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