Decentralized Edge Caching under Budget and Storage Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2026-05-05

AI Summary

This study addresses the inefficiencies and economic inequities arising from cache resource competition under constrained storage at edge devices and heterogeneous budget limitations among content providers. To tackle this, the authors propose a hierarchical game-theoretic framework: an upper-level Stackelberg game captures the leader–follower relationship between edge devices and content providers, while a lower-level non-cooperative game models inter-provider competition. Under mild storage constraints, this lower-level game is shown to constitute an exact potential game, guaranteeing the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that storage scarcity exacerbates inequality among providers and strengthens the bargaining power of edge devices. Simulations confirm that the proposed decentralized algorithm converges efficiently and stably, with convergence behavior primarily driven by provider competition rather than the scale of edge infrastructure.

Abstract

The rapid growth of mobile social networks (MSNs) has significantly increased the demand for low-latency and reliable content delivery, motivating the deployment of edge caching systems. In practice, multiple content providers (CPs) compete for the limited storage resources of edge devices (EDs), while facing heterogeneous budgets and operational costs. This paper investigates a decentralized multi-CP edge caching framework that jointly accounts for CP budget constraints, ED storage limitations, and strategic interactions among all entities. We formulate the interaction between CPs and EDs as a hierarchical game, combining a Stackelberg model for CP-ED interactions with a non-cooperative game among competing CPs. Under light storage constraints, we show that CP competition constitutes an exact potential game, ensuring the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and enabling decentralized convergence. When storage constraints are binding, the resulting game loses this structure; nevertheless, extensive simulations demonstrate stable and efficient convergence in practice. Through a comprehensive numerical evaluation, we show that convergence behavior is primarily driven by CP competition rather than the scale of edge infrastructure. We further reveal that storage scarcity fundamentally alters economic outcomes, amplifying inequality among CPs while increasing the relative bargaining power of EDs. The proposed framework provides a scalable and economically grounded solution for decentralized resource allocation in multi-provider edge caching systems.

Problem

• edge caching
• budget constraints
• storage constraints
• content providers
• resource allocation

Innovation

• decentralized edge caching
• hierarchical game
• exact potential game
• budget constraints
• storage scarcity