Zero-Trust Bilateral Edge Service Trading with Deposit-Refund Regulation for Runtime Compliance

2026-05-03

AI Summary

This work addresses the lack of modeling how runtime compliance jointly influences bilateral clearing, ex-post settlement, and sellers’ future eligibility in zero-trust edge environments. To bridge this gap, we propose ZEBRIS, the first framework integrating runtime compliance into bilateral trading mechanisms for dynamic edge service markets. ZEBRIS models service bundle transactions through a zero-trust security architecture and achieves positive-margin bilateral clearing under security and resource constraints by jointly considering resource-aware scheduling, buyer valuations, and seller bids. Furthermore, it introduces a compliance-aware capped deposit-refund mechanism that ties refunds to sellers’ future security credentials to mitigate moral hazard. Experimental results demonstrate that ZEBRIS significantly enhances social welfare and compliance robustness while reducing service latency and privacy-risk-weighted costs.

Abstract

Privacy-sensitive edge services necessitate optimizing diverse-type resource scheduling to support trustworthy provisioning within a zero-trust security framework. However, existing studies rarely model how runtime compliance jointly affects bilateral clearing, ex-post settlement, and future seller eligibility in dynamic edge markets. To address this issue, we propose ZEBRIS, a zero-trust bilateral edge service trading framework with deposit-refund regulation for privacy-sensitive services. Specifically, edge provisioning is modeled as a trading form of zero-trust-compliant service packages, where the buyer-side effective valuation captures service value, delay penalty, and privacy risk, while the seller-side effective ask incorporates resource and compliance costs. This yields a resource-aware positive-margin bilateral clearing mechanism under shared resource and security constraints. To discipline post-clearing moral hazard, we further design a capped deposit-refund settlement rule based on measurable runtime compliance and update each seller's future security posture according to realized compliance outcomes. ZEBRIS satisfies bilateral individual rationality and no-subsidy weak budget balance. Experiments demonstrate that ZEBRIS improves social welfare and compliance robustness while reducing service delay and privacy-risk-weighted cost over representative baselines.

Problem

• zero-trust
• edge service trading
• runtime compliance
• privacy-sensitive services
• bilateral clearing

Innovation

• zero-trust
• bilateral trading
• deposit-refund mechanism
• runtime compliance
• edge service provisioning