Are we Doomed to an AI Race? Why Self-Interest Could Drive Countries Towards a Moratorium on Superintelligence

2026-05-02

AI Summary

This study addresses the global risks posed by strategic competition among major powers in developing artificial superintelligence (ASI). By constructing a game-theoretic model, it analyzes nations’ strategic interactions in ASI development and quantifies the trade-off between the benefits of technological leadership and the systemic costs of potential loss of control. The work demonstrates, for the first time from a self-interested rationality perspective, that when the risk of catastrophic失控 is sufficiently high, states may voluntarily agree to pause ASI development—challenging the prevailing assumption that an AI arms race is inevitable. Integrating empirical data on evolving global risk perceptions, the paper further shows that rising awareness of ASI-related dangers is enhancing the practical feasibility of such rationally motivated moratoria.

Abstract

This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.

Problem

• Artificial Superintelligence
• moratorium
• game theory
• geopolitical risk
• catastrophic risk

Innovation

• game theory
• Artificial Superintelligence
• moratorium
• strategic interaction
• catastrophic risk