🤖 AI Summary
In standard epistemic modal logics, Rumsfeldian ignorance (“unknown unknowns”) is trivially definable in terms of ordinary ignorance (“known unknowns”), due to their shared accessibility relation—eroding the conceptual distinctness of the former.
Method: The authors introduce a two-modal framework that distinguishes the accessibility relations underlying implicit knowledge operators: one for ordinary ignorance and another for Rumsfeldian ignorance, thereby blocking the definability of the latter in terms of the former. They develop non-trivial axiom systems over several natural classes of bimodal frames and reconstruct Kit Fine’s related results via formal semantic analysis.
Contribution/Results: The paper establishes strong completeness theorems for these systems over multiple frame classes. It provides the first independent logical characterization of Rumsfeldian ignorance, restoring and extending its substantive logical status within epistemic logic.
📝 Abstract
In a recent paper, Kit Fine presents some striking results concerning the logical properties of (first-order) ignorance, second-order ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance. However, Rumsfeld ignorance is definable in terms of ignorance, which makes some existing results and the axiomatization problem trivial. A main reason is that the accessibility relations for the implicit knowledge operator contained in the packaged operators of ignorance and Rumsfeld ignorance are the same. In this work, we assume the two accessibility relations to be different so that one of them is an arbitrary subset of the other. This will avoid the definability issue and retain most of the previous validities. The main results are axiomatizations over various proper bi-frame classes. Finally we apply our framework to analyze Fine's results.