🤖 AI Summary
GNSS signals exhibit low power and are inherently vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks; moreover, existing defense mechanisms often rely on prior knowledge of the receiver’s position or the nature of the attack. This paper proposes SCHIEBER, a robust multi-antenna-based approach that simultaneously suppresses jamming and identifies spoofing sources without requiring either the receiver’s initial position or prior information about the attack type. SCHIEBER first applies adaptive spatial filtering to dynamically mitigate both wideband and narrowband jamming. Subsequently, it jointly estimates signal direction-of-arrival (DoA) and pseudoranges, then leverages geometric consistency between these estimates to detect spoofing—where the consistency test is invariant to unknown receiver location. Evaluated in GPS L1 C/A simulations, SCHIEBER effectively counters concurrent multiple jamming types and multi-source spoofing attacks, significantly enhancing positioning robustness and reliability.
📝 Abstract
Modern positioning relies on radio signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Their low receive power renders these radio signals susceptible to jamming attacks, in which malicious transmitters emit strong interference to disrupt signal acquisition. Moreover, GNSS are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which malicious transmitters mimic legitimate satellites by transmitting spurious GNSS signals. We propose SCHIEBER, a novel method for multi-antenna GNSS receivers that mitigates jammers as well as spoofers without requiring any prior knowledge of the receiver position or attack type: Jammers are mitigated during signal acquisition using a recently developed adaptive spatial filtering technique. Spoofers are identified and rejected after signal acquisition using a novel approach that tests the consistency of acquired signals by comparing their respective direction of arrival (DoA) and pseudorange estimates in a test that is invariant with respect to the unknown receiver position. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method using extensive simulations of a GPS L1 C/A system under spoofing and jamming attacks.