Evaluating calibrated refusal and safe usefulness in dual-use biology settings

📅 2026-07-05
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the dual-use biosecurity risks posed by AI systems that accelerate life science research, emphasizing the urgent need to evaluate their ability to differentially refuse legitimate versus covertly malicious requests. The authors introduce BioSecBench-Refusal, a benchmark comprising 61 standard research tasks and 46 red-teamed adversarial tasks, to systematically quantify refusal behaviors of mainstream AI agents for the first time. Using a multi-model, tool-chain evaluation framework combined with API filtering and autonomous reasoning analysis, they find that current systems frequently misreject legitimate queries while failing to block high-risk ones: refusal rates range from 7% to 74% on standard tasks but only 1% to 62% on red-team tasks, with some configurations exhibiting higher rejection of benign than malicious requests. Models endowed with reasoning capabilities demonstrate enhanced potential for threat discrimination.
📝 Abstract
As AI agents are incorporated into life science workflows, the capabilities that speed discovery might also enable misuse. We present BioSecBench-Refusal, a benchmark for risk identification and refusal behavior for biological research tasks. The benchmark pairs 61 Routine tasks, legitimate analyses adapted from the published literature, with 46 Red-Team tasks, fictional scenarios that resemble real research but conceal a biosecurity hazard. Across 16 model-harness configurations, refusal rates ranged from 7\% to 74\% on Routine tasks and 1\% to 62\% on Red-Team tasks, with many configurations refusing legitimate Routine work at comparable or higher rates than concealed hazards. Refusals were most often triggered by provider API filters applied prior to agentic reasoning. However, models given room to reason showed the potential to identify more real threats. We release BioSecBench-Refusal as a tool for model developers to calibrate capability and caution for agentic biotech R\&D.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

AI safety
biosecurity
refusal behavior
dual-use biology
risk identification
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

BioSecBench-Refusal
refusal behavior
dual-use biology
red-teaming
agentic AI
E
Edwin H. Wintermute
American Wetware, Boston, MA
H
Harmon Bhasin
LatchBio, San Francisco, CA
C
Christina M. Agapakis
American Wetware, Boston, MA
D
Dianzhuo Wang
LatchBio, San Francisco, CA
E
Evan Seeyave
LatchBio, San Francisco, CA
A
Arjun Banerjee
LatchBio, San Francisco, CA
D
Daniel Fulop
M
Matthew C. Watson
A
Adam J. Meyer
S
Sandrine Boissel
J
Jens H. Kuhn
Rishi Jain
Rishi Jain
MD Student, Feinberg School of Medicine
NeurosurgeryArtificial IntelligenceSpineNeuro-Oncology
N
Noah D. Taylor
H
Helena Shomar
P
Patrick M. Boyle
American Wetware, Boston, MA
K
Kenny Workman
LatchBio, San Francisco, CA