BMC4TimeSec: Verification Of Timed Security Protocols

📅 2026-02-19
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🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the challenge of verifying security protocols with timing constraints in complex temporal environments by proposing an end-to-end formal verification method based on Timed Interpretation Systems (TIS/TIIS). The approach uniquely integrates the TIS/TIIS framework with knowledge automata to jointly model the temporal behaviors and epistemic evolution of multiple agents, including adversaries. Automated verification is achieved through SMT solving and bounded model checking. The contributions include a reproducible open-source verification toolkit, accompanying source code, and demonstration videos, which have been successfully applied to verify the security of several representative timed protocols, significantly advancing the formal analysis capabilities for timing-sensitive security protocols.

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📝 Abstract
We present BMC4TimeSec, an end-to-end tool for verifying Timed Security Protocols (TSP) based on SMT-based bounded model checking and multi-agent modelling in the form of Timed Interpreted Systems (TIS) and Timed Interleaved Interpreted Systems (TIIS). In BMC4TimeSec, TSP executions implement the TIS/TIIS environment (join actions, interleaving, delays, lifetimes), and knowledge automata implement the agents (evolution of participant knowledge, including the intruder). The code is publicly available on \href{https://github.com/agazbrzezny/BMC4TimeSec}{GitHub}, as is a \href{https://youtu.be/aNybKz6HwdA}{video} demonstration.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Timed Security Protocols
Verification
Bounded Model Checking
Multi-agent Systems
Knowledge Evolution
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Bounded Model Checking
Timed Security Protocols
Timed Interpreted Systems
Knowledge Automata
SMT-based Verification
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Agnieszka M. Zbrzezny
Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Design, SWPS University, Warsaw, Poland