🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the rationing of peer review resources in economics journals by surveying submission fees across 500 journals and constructing a sequential submission game model that identifies fees as residual clearing prices beyond waiting times. Results indicate that 22.6% of journals charge fees, predominantly among top-tier publications. Such fees effectively reduce system-wide review demand only when they incentivize authors to shorten submission chains or target journals with lower reporting requirements. By quantifying the conditional suppression effect of submission fees on reviewing pressure, this research reveals the limitations of market mechanisms in allocating academic publishing resources. The findings suggest that while fees can modulate submission behavior under specific conditions, their efficacy as a standalone tool for managing peer review workloads remains constrained within the current scholarly communication ecosystem.
📝 Abstract
Economics journals ration access to peer review with time and money. A July 2026 census of 500 RePEc-ranked economics journals accepting unsolicited submissions finds that 113 (22.6 per cent) charge a fee, with incidence falling from 68 per cent in the top 50 to 2 per cent in the bottom 50. A sequential-submission model shows that waiting pays part of the capacity-clearing price, leaving the fee as a residual. Because rejected manuscripts move down the ranking, a fee reduces system-wide referee demand only when authors stop, shorten their submission chains or switch to journals requiring fewer reports.