Free Information Disrupts Even Bayesian Crowds

📅 2026-04-02
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
📄 PDF
🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates how unconstrained information exchange can impair the accuracy of collective beliefs, even among groups of fully rational and cooperative agents. Using a multi-agent computational model that integrates Bayesian inference with information diffusion dynamics, the work demonstrates for the first time that unrestricted information flow may lead to systematic errors in group judgment, despite all individuals possessing perfect Bayesian reasoning capabilities. This finding directly challenges the prevailing assumption that increased communication necessarily enhances collective intelligence. The results provide a theoretical foundation for designing information regulation mechanisms on high-impact platforms such as social media, where unmoderated sharing may paradoxically degrade the epistemic quality of group beliefs.
📝 Abstract
A core tenet underpinning the conception of contemporary information networks, such as social media platforms, is that users should not be constrained in the amount of information they can freely and willingly exchange with one another about a given topic. By means of a computational agent-based model, we show how even in groups of truth-seeking and cooperative agents with perfect information-processing abilities, unconstrained information exchange may lead to detrimental effects on the correctness of the group's beliefs. If unconstrained information exchange can be detrimental even among such idealized agents, it is prudent to assume it can also be so in practice. We therefore argue that constraints on information flow should be carefully considered in the design of communication networks with substantial societal impact, such as social media platforms.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

information exchange
crowd belief
social media
information networks
Bayesian agents
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

information overload
Bayesian agents
agent-based modeling
belief convergence
information constraints
🔎 Similar Papers
No similar papers found.
Jonas Stein
Jonas Stein
University of Groningen
computational sociologyanalytical sociology
S
Shannon Cruz
Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, The Pennsylvania State University, USA
Davide Grossi
Davide Grossi
University of Groningen (Bernoulli Institute, CogniGron) & University of Amsterdam (ILLC, ACLE)
Computational Social ChoiceComputational Game TheoryDigital DemocracyAlgorithmic GovernanceLogic
M
Martina Testori
Greenwich Business School, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, UK