Modeling Decision-Making with Will for Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

2026-05-09

AI Summary

This study addresses the limitations of the classical rational agent model, which attributes cooperation failure in social dilemmas solely to insufficient incentives while overlooking how persistent utility maximization undermines system stability. The authors propose “volitional agents” that base decisions on potential minimization rather than cumulative utility maximization, enabling them to maintain cooperative commitments despite short-term payoff fluctuations. Integrating infinite-population dynamical analysis with spatiotemporal Stag Hunt multi-agent simulations, the research demonstrates that heterogeneous volitional strength combined with the capacity for temporary rational reassessment can surpass high-risk cooperation thresholds. The volition mechanism substantially reduces the feasible state space, accelerates convergence, and acts as a “cooperation catalyst” in scenarios where pure utility maximization fails, thereby significantly enhancing collective cooperation levels.

Abstract

Standard rational actor models often attribute cooperation failures in social dilemmas to insufficient incentives, overlooking the destabilizing effects of continuous utility maximization. To address this, we propose a framework of ``will" defined as a mechanism that persistently pursues goals while ignoring local cost-benefit fluctuations. We formalize the Willed Agents as potential minimizers, distinguishing them from cumulative utility maximization. Dynamical analysis of infinite population demonstrates that willed agents shrink the feasible state space, acting as boundary constraints that accelerate convergence in canonical social dilemmas. Through multi-agent simulations in a spatiotemporal Stag Hunt Game, we show that willed agents function as ``cooperation catalysts", enabling groups to surmount high-risk thresholds where purely utility maximization fails. We find that heterogeneous will strength promotes cooperation, and that agents who autonomously suspend rational re-evaluation can significantly outperform continuous optimizers. These findings suggest that successful cooperation relies on the cognitive capacity to strategically constrain calculation.

Problem

• social dilemmas
• cooperation
• rational actor models
• utility maximization
• will

Innovation

• will
• potential minimization
• social dilemmas
• cooperation catalysts
• bounded rationality